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 L ast year, Congress passed the
 Ryan White Care Act Amend-
 ments of 1996. The amend-
 ments authorize ten million dollars for
 each fiscal year from 1996 through
 2000 for counseling pregnant women
 on HIV disease, for "outreach efforts to
 pregnant women at high risk of HIV
 who are not currently receiving prenatal
 care," and for voluntary testing for preg-
 nant women.
 The amendments compromise a
 central question: whether prenatal and
 neonatal AIDS testing should be com-
 pelled. The compromise is complex.
 The director of the Centers for Disease
 Control and Prevention is instructed to
 establish a system for states to use to dis-
 cover and report the number of cases in
 which infants have acquired AIDS in
 utero. The secretary of the Department
 of Health and Human Services (DHHS)
 is to use those reports to decide whether
 the following practices have become
 routine: to provide HIV testing for in-
 fants whose mothers have not been pre-
 natally tested; to disclose the results of
 such tests to the mother and to others
 who have or are likely to have legal re-
 sponsibility for the child; to disclose the
 results of prenatal tests for HIV disease
 promptly to the pregnant woman; to
 provide counseling along with test re-
 sults; and finally for states to prohibit
 health insurers from canceling insur-
 ance because someone has HIV disease
 or has been tested for it.
 If the DHHS secretary decides these
 five practices have become routine,
 states wanting full funding under the
 Ryan White Care Act must legally re-
 quire each one. However, states need
 not do so if their rate of new cases of
 perinatally acquired AIDS has declined
 by at least 50 percent since 1993 or if
 "[a]t least 95 percent of women in the
 State who have received at least two
 prenatal visits (consultations) prior to
 thirty-four weeks of gestation with a
 health care provider or provider group
 have been tested." Finally, the DHHS
 s cretary must have the Institute of
 Medicine prepare a report for Congress
 on the amendments' effectiveness in re-
 ducing the perinatal transmission of
 HIV
 The question whether prenatal and
 neonatal HIV testing should be the
 uncoerced or even uninfluenced choice
 of pregnant women and mothers has
 been debated for some time. There has
 been a good deal of feeling that testing
 should not just be more widely avail-
 able, but that it should be vigorously
 encouraged and even compelled. How-
 ever, that se timent has often been met
 ( specially i  the academy) with skepti-
 cism and even hostility. One eminently
 moderate example of such skepticism is
 the r p rt of the National Research
 Council's Panel on Monitoring the So-
 cial Impact of the AIDS Epidemic.'
 The panel's report explains that chil-
 dren who are infected with HIV
 need extra attention from the point
 of birth .. . [R]oughly 20 percent
 of newborns with HIV become ill
 with AIDS-related infections with-
 in a year of their infection. Once ill,
 they tend to spend more days in the
 hospital than adults with AIDS.
 They typically have chronic growth
 problems, as well as developmental
 problems in both motor and lan-
 guage skills ... And all the required
 care will be delivered by someone
 who knows that it is highly proba-
 ble that the child will die.
 The report adds that "most clinicians
 now believe that it is important to iden-
 tify in infancy children who may be in-
 fected in order to begin prophylactic
 treatment and to monitor them for
 signs of treatable infections."
 These data, of course, suggest one
 motivation for testing: to identify chil-
 dren who may need special care. This
 identification, however, is not straight-
 forward. All pregnant women infected
 with HIV pass on antibodies to their
 newborn children. But only about a
 quarter of those children are actually
 infected.
 Having described a rationale for ag-
 gressive testing, the panel's report ex-
 pounds the opposing view. The report
 says that if pregnant women are tested
 to identify children who might benefit
 from medical attention, "the state is, in
 the view of many, using the woman
 simply as a vehicle for reaching her
 child." If the state tests children after
 birth without their mothers' consent,
 the state "imposes two forms of intru-
sion on the mother. First, it compels her
 to learn her own status [since the test
 reveals the mother's antibodies] . . .
 Second, . . . imposing the test overrides
 the mother's control over her child in a
 society that leaves nearly all decisions
 about children to parents."
 In short, the report approaches test-
 ing primarily in terms of the mother's
 rights, although less emphatically so
 than many other comments. This is
 surely a basic element of the way a court
 would approach the question. And the
 report's cautious conclusion-that "the
 great reluctance to override parental
 choice is probably defensible"-might
 well be the result courts would reach
 were the issue fully litigated. But a thor-
 ough judicial treatment of the rights
 question would encounter a number of
 revealing complexities.
 The report says, "When the Su-
 preme Court speaks of a constitutional
 presumption of biological parents' con-
 trol over a child's life, it is speaking of
 rights that belong to the parent, not
 rights that belong to the child." Parents'
 constitutional claims to the companion-
 ship of their children surely does partly
 rest on our social respect for the fact
 that "most parents regard begetting and
 raising children as one of life's most ful-
filling activities." Perhaps that also ex-
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 plains parents' constitutional claims to
 make decisions for their children. That
 basis for parental rights is unproblemat-
 ic where the parents' interests seem to
 coincide with their children's, so that
 the contest is between the state on one
 hand and the parent and the child to-
 gether on the other. But should parental
 fulfillment be a basis for parental rights
 where that fulfillment may injure the
 child?
 Even if one's answer to that question
 were no, parental rights might still be
 justified on the theory that freeing par-
 ents to make decisions for their children
 protects the children. The rationale
 would be that generally parents know
 and love their children better than the
 state and that parents will therefore,
 again, generally, make wiser decisions
 for their children than the state. But
 then what do we do when the question
 in a case is whether the general rule ap-
 plies? The panel's report does propose
 "some child-centered reasons why a
 mother . . . might refuse testing for her
 child." These include the stigma the
 child might suffer and the possibility
 that the mother's learning she was HIV-
 positive might "interfere with her ca-
 pacity to parent." But the report also ac-
 knowledges, and with reason, that "em-
 powering parents to refuse HIV testing
 for their newborn appears to pit the in-
 terests of parents against the interests of
 children since a child cannot be treated
 if her or his illness is not known."
 But suppose the report is correct in
 saying that the relevant right is the par-
 ent's and not the child's. Is this appro-
 priate? Parents' rights are justified, the
 report says, by our social respect for the
 fulfillment they find in parenthood. Do
 we not socially respect the fulfillment,
 the health, and the lives of children?
 Should we not promote those interests
 by attributing rights to children? These
 questions have increasingly been asked
 in recent years. They are inspired partly
 by concern about the prevalence of
 child abuse and by the fear that strong
 parental rights have inhibited attempts
 to keep parents from harming their chil-
 dren. For example, some years ago ideas
 about parental rights helped intensify
 reluctance to remove abused and ne-
 glected children from their parents.
 Today, that reluctance is receding. Simi-
 larly, cases in which parents who had
 become separated from their children
 for a number of years have sought to re-
 trieve them from the people who had
 raised them since birth have provoked
 uneasiness about ambitious versions of
 parents' rights.
 Whatever the basis for parental
 rights, legal doctrine does not hold that
 the state may never infringe them. Of
 course the state needs good reasons. But
 here its reason looks impressive, since
 protecting the health of infants is such a
 worthy enterprise. The state must also
 show that its means-here mandatory
 testing-are necessary to reach its
 goal-protecting infected children. But
 if the state could make such a showing,
 the individual's right would yield to the
 state's interest. Roe v. Wade itself illus-
 trates that principle, for there the Court
 permitted states to regulate abortions
 ever more fully as pregnancy progressed
 and the state's interest grew.
 In 1994, the year after the panel's re-
 port, the debate over prenatal testing
 was complicated by news that perinatal
 transmission of HIV can be reduced
 from about 25 percent to about 8 per-
 cent by administering zidovudine to
 HIV-infected women. This develop-
 ment, welcome as it is, seems to intensi-
 fy the claims of both sides. Now prena-
 tal testing does not just identify chil-
 dren who might need treatment. It also
 identifies women who could be treated
 to protect the children they would soon
 bear. This development enhances claims
 for prenatal testing, since it offers the
 prospect of actually saving some chil-
 dren from becoming infected.
 On the other hand, this same devel-
 opment sharpens the mothers' rights ar-
 gument by bringing it closer to the
 kinds of claims about reproductive free-
 dom that animated Roe. Once again,
 however, judicial rights thinking is not
 unambiguous. Roe held that govern-
 ment may not prohibit abortions in
 many circumstances. But the cases that
 followed Roe suggest that Roe instituted
 something less than full-fledged repro-
 ductive freedom. In those cases, for ex-
 ample, the Court has countenanced
 regulations that influence but do not
 dictate women's choice whether to have
 abortions. And the abortion-funding
 cases say that government may seek to
 sway reproductive choice through its
 budgetary powers.
 It is morally and legally necessary to
 discuss testing in terms of rights. Not
 only does the controversy about it raise
 questions of human rights, but-as I
 have sought to show-even the legal
 language of rights offers some resources
 for recognizing and probing the com-
 plexities those questions raise.
 But the law's resources can take us
 only so far. Much of the rights literature
 on testing disappoints because it seems
 so much absorbed by the arguments for
 one side. Too little of it attempts to ex-
 plore how the conflicting rights claims
 can be compared and reconciled. The
 panel's report is markedly more con-
 cerned with children's interests than
 much of the literature. But even it seems
 to detail the parental rights with thor-
 oughness and force, discussing the other
 possible claims hardly more than im-
 plicitly. This failure of the literature
 may be understandable. Ultimately, the
 law is baffled by conflicts between the
 interests of two rights holders. It is baf-
 fled because, as I suggested, the law has
 failed to articulate satisfactorily the
 basis for the rights it has announced.
 And it is baffled because reconciling
 rights requires a subtlety and a sensitivi-
 ty to particulars that law, as a system of
 rules, cannot easily attain.
 In addition, of course, the wisdom of
 any testing policy turns on more than
 rights. We need to ask whether even
 mandatory testing will significantly re-
 duce the rate of perinatal transmission
 of HIV, whether similar improvements
 could be obtained in other ways, and
 even whether spending scarce funds
 on the perinatal transmission of HIV is
 the best expenditure of public health
 dollars.
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